Core Tip Battle of failure is marked by Guangchang

 Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the war, significant changes occurred in the guidance. The fifth against appropriate. Accordingly, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission pay more attention to construction of the fortress, trying to use Fort on the fort, and the KMT launched couch dispute every inch of the battle to defend the basic position of defensive way of fighting the Red Army. This is so, of course, first of all referrals should be noted by the CPC at this time, after the Communist International, has major strategic shift on the agenda, try to resist the depth of Soviet KMT, won the preparation time for the strategic shift is one of the important considerations ; the other hand, often losing the battle in front of them on the defense motion,Discount UGG boots, casting doubt continue to adhere to also say that it is an important reason. KMT observation: tactical, and tactical use of fortress (front tactics), to the offensive. later, more seriously. cover military bunker looms, he can seek in inorganic warfare, so had to change course, all over the building strong fortifications, and I for trench warfare, blocking my way to map among themselves along its Gou, find Finally the struggle. Academic Press, original title: It is in this campaign, the CPC Central Committee began to consider strategic shift. Over the years, Guangchang campaign has been wrong as the military line of the CPC Central Committee at the specimen, the failure is that clearly indicates the overall strategy of the CPC Central Committee was an error. However, when we are faced with specific historical facts, not without surprise to find that the above principle is not necessarily set on a strong historical support. In this paper, Guangchang campaign centered on the fifth attempt against . An anti-Communist advance. This means that the KMT has been extended to Soviet troops reach the basic region, Communist fifth Although the impact of the Fujian Incident, but the Kuomintang army in half a year-long Soviet periphery of the KMT in the fifth The fifth against October 1933, the CPC Central Committee's instructions to the Fujian Zhejiang-Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee, criticized the idea that purely defensive, stressed: number of units being much smaller than the enemy we have the time, forces were divided into mouth, in fact, enable us to focus on the enemy's brutal attack in front of troops to lift their arm. White areas of active guerrilla warfare in-depth, development and expansion of Soviet Area. November, the Revolutionary Military Commission acting chairman of the British entry requirements: General Political Department issued instructions to carry out the work of guerrillas, said: the struggle. Principles of warfare, the Communist International has also repeatedly emphasized. Back in March 1933, the Communist International Power said the CPC Central Military Policy: Article possible escape route, ready to land in the sparsely populated base areas established to protect supplies and waiting for a good time to cover the Red Army. to avoid the enemy's large team of people to do useless conflict, to take to lure the enemy in depth, scattered the enemy and disrupt enemy Army, wear down the enemy's strategy and approach to maximize the use of guerrilla warfare. War of the way, but should the enemy flanks to warfare. Comintern these views, at least in theory unified the basic operational concept of the CPC, Li recalls: generally agreed that: CCP's this warfare, the deepest experience of his rival Chiang Kai-shek, in December 1933 he spoke: At that time the CPC Central Committee Wang Ming had a major impact on the awareness of this issue is clear. December 1933, the Comintern Executive Committee in his speech about the 13th plenary meeting, the CPC Central Committee is running an important part of military policy is: temporarily totally denied in part the end of the military strategy of retreat may be necessary (for example, in order to avoid excessive force and the end of fighting the enemy; or for the taking the time to prepare and find a good opportunity to further attack, etc.), that is, to preserve Red Army strength, meaning it has the first such estimate was insufficient or do not understand, mechanical understanding of the task to consolidate bases, or even a large number of Red Army forces that can be sacrificed to achieve this objective. an : not decide the outcome of the struggle. suffered a deep understanding. It should be noted, the war, after all, the opposing strategy and tactics of each contest, the Nationalist side in the fifth fighting chance to attack, To lure the enemy in depth, for example, the military forces of the Kuomintang on the edge and into the absolute extreme caution when soldiers led the Red Army man concentrating a superior force of enemy troops into the fight against sudden opportunity to greatly reduce, Li spoke: annihilation within the favorable conditions, as long as not to lure the enemy deep, that the enemy does not give up the fortress war, it did not want ... ... We ambush here, and no enemy can continue without interruption in the fortress that it plans to policy. Is this not mean that we give up an important region of the Soviet, not to wipe out the enemy's effective strength by time. the enemy, is not reliable and effective method for the. Central Red Army against Peng and other direct combat this deeply troubling, not without impatient, said: large-scale combat with the enemy. should not be static. In fact, the third against inside war strategy, on the contrary to take the offensive line operations strategy. deployment. This is the original tactics to lure the enemy deep in contrast to just be described as the best form of military impermanence comment. In Fort doctrine developed today, this means going to become a regular means of warfare. fully embodies the idea of unruly Mao Zedong, haughty character, specific strategy, military strategy and its consistent is consistent. However, when Communist China's military, political decision makers, in the future has not completely hopeless, but also previous against vision. Moreover, the existing power of the Red Army, advancing to the depth of the Kuomintang regime region does not have a mass base, the area is limited room for maneuver warfare, the risk is enormous. After all, Mao Zedong Thought is precisely to establish a base for enemy weaknesses in the foundation. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee was chosen to start in the Central Soviet Area against The point is that later proved, to continue fighting to stay in the Central Soviet, in fact, means that the fifth choice. Only in the fifth against results, rather than positive results. Line operations when Mao Zedong's thought, he is actually the idea of warfare into the country on such a large board to re-positioning, which can be said that the essence of warfare is won, and adhere to the Communist International and the warfare of the CPC Central Committee, although principle, but at the time the internal situation of Soviet guerrilla warfare as the reduction of liquidity,UGG boots clearance, in fact there have been difficult to play its power. However, we really can not therefore deny that the CPC was still trying to implement the principles of warfare, Zunyi Meeting about the resolution: outside the line that is no bastion of the Red Army to the majority of area activities, forcing the enemy to come and we had to leave the fort for warfare. and this forms the main body that at the time is Two Against The mobilization of the implementation of the Kuomintang army of annihilation, the effective strength to combat the Kuomintang army, to break the blockade of the Kuomintang army, to maintain the links between Fujian and Zhejiang-Jiangxi Soviet, destruction KMT stronghold tactics. The tactics, and the fourth against Central Revolutionary Military Commission expectations: decisive battle. The military forces of the Kuomintang and the absolute advantage of the special attention of fortifications, the Red Army into the KMT controlled areas, the straitjacket imposed, not only difficult to mobilize each other, their posterior is also often in danger of being cut off. Red 13 division when he was director of the Political Department of Mo-Hua spoke: operations, so we start in a passive position, can be said punches. KMT launched a campaign defense. At that time, it is generally agreed: Is considered a negative defense policy implemented Li and Xiang Ying was made clear that the Red Army against to drain our troops and weapons, to Fort, at the enemy's movement, to destroy the animate force find the enemy movement, especially the flank his circuitous purposes, or for the purposes of the terrain and to the time surrounded and violently assault the enemy quickly and the second column, the third tier of flank. summary also mentioned: The so-called . Li specifies the main principles of the tactics: most determined to use the highest degree of the main forces to do battle to avoid the extension of is to attract the enemy in the fort, the concentration of superior forces quickly surrounded the implementation of the enemy, destroy quick decision,cheap UGG boots, , Communist military forces during this period included a few basic principles: the rapid, sudden, movement, concentration of forces. The tactics in the fifth against October 1933 mid-term Battle of Britain on the nitrate issue instructions: large forces operations, should not be any attacks to the saltpeter. early initiation of decisive force. November 27, It should be said, the Li summed up the KMT new round of large-scale campaign to lure the enemy deep battle is unlikely, shortness of relative surprise approach should be a viable option. Mainly contains short assault two aspects: First, the defensive use of support points in order to attract the enemy. Anchor the defense is not a goal: should be the vanguard of the enemy (reconnaissance, avant-garde guerrilla, etc.) operations, and forced the enemy's main expansion, when performing this task, that is, after a planned move to an area ... ... campaign to ensure that our defense is the main force in the Under favorable conditions for the purposes of surprise maneuvers, such as premature withdrawal or a tenacious fight the battle, we can not guarantee that these conditions pose. these wars, should help create tactical environment in which we can achieve the basic principle: that is, the mobile initiative, in the fortress, the elimination of enemy forces animate. the concentration of a sudden blow, wipe out enemies. This is the key to short surprise: In fact, the Red Army has always been warfare tactics to lure the enemy in depth can not be left short of its key words, assault, from this point that the short campaign does not have the tactical principle, the number of new content, but in the operational principles of the new KMT warfare under the strategy adjustments. Overall, the short campaign tactics, as a durable defensive tactics under a general policy principles, focus on defensive play in the Red Army as far as possible concentrate on playing good advantage of warfare to wipe out the enemy's effective strength and not to simply maintain the principle of geographical. The strength of the tactical requirements as motor control, to avoid consuming too much with the enemy, but also to minimize their sacrifice. Central Revolutionary Military Commission stressed: . in the initiative, determination and resolve to achieve the flexibility here is of great significance. the victory has been obtained for all the tenacity of victory when the brave and quit fighting in the negative, not contradictory, but mutually supporting, This care good (calm and determined) the proper use of the commander. In addition to Li, the Red Army's main commander Zhu De, Peng, Lin Biao, etc. The author also discusses the short campaign tactics. Army chief Peng Hong Sanjun group talked about: Only in this way a positive action, for each battle, the Battle of victory could be carried out to complete a lasting strategy. to be able to firm and tenacious resistance to complement each other, there is great significance. put the enemy and the enemy march so that I destroy the main force of the enemy's movement, as I and the main thrust was not a place to move forward when the enemy should be to exercise a defensive force, delay the enemy's main force arrived ahead ... ... I , and if the firm is not yet see the enemy fortifications, places the main attack, as the enemy fortress already very strong, but not ready to contact the Fort should feint with the siege of the fortress, and to make contact against the enemy troops or reinforcements of the team at Fort . Although the senior Army tactical command level on short campaign and a degree of recognition, but in the overall strategy of the kinds of cases, although you can play a certain shortness of surprise results, their performance is still limited. First, the KMT to take moving steadily, step by step strategy in the context of advancing to seize other opportunities sudden assault troops into the very limited, as Reid himself has said, the KMT army boldly forward, five miles from Ten Mile the other set of forces is so thick, the Red Army in order to seize its a war of annihilation of the victories achieved, difficulties; Secondly, the KMT army very Zhaixia positive, with great depth of the Group forward, warfare, the results are still fighting fortresses,bailey UGG boots, and a large line of troops on this occasion to brief, sudden surprise, the result is still not easy to shake off after fired The combat phase, loss and sacrifice go far too large, long-term is difficult to bear the Red Army. Therefore, the short campaign tactics may be said to be passive in the strategic context of the tactical choice of a helpless, although it is the background and rationale for its establishment, but unlike the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and Reid would expect to play a huge performance. As Lin pointed out: geographical fortress, the formal, large model of warfare, a lot of destroying the enemy's effective strength. short surprise though is a kind of warfare, but if we are completely tied to the way this battle is very wrong. On the other hand , if you do not believe that this short campaign to destroy the enemy combatants have the possibility of causing the possibility of victory in battle on, to the neglect of this battle, the damage is even more dangerous. the main force into the more generous no fortress against the warfare of ideas, and Mao Zedong's idea is the same, but in the circumstances, the reality may still be in the fortress line to look for movement fighting chance, which he supports In fact, should not be denied, when the Chinese military commanders have also explore more of the response strategy. They asked cadres at all levels: must often estimate the enemy, our army, terrain and time, when the shift change in each case, we should simply pass on the basic set their own determination. the application of tactical principles. the enemy and our tactics are changing in the achievements in development, the argument that if these principles is insufficient, it would have to fight in the current environment, considered behind the times. The basic advantages of a high degree of mobility arbitrariness and courageous assault. warfare opportunity to seize the opportunity to warfare, and warfare, I was a lot of destroying the enemy main force, the number of divisions each to destroy him. In fact, the initial phase of the campaign Guangchang campaign ideas and views of the forest quite consistent in this place. The movement of the three perimeter defense Guangchang Guangchang entered by the North Central Soviet area after the first basic county, hundreds of kilometers away from the red capital of Ruijin, a major barrier for the Ruijin. With the KMT army to Ruijin Road, for an attack in the direction of the Central Soviet deepened, Guangchang will become an important object of attack. Early April 1934, the KMT Third Army troops began to advance Guangchang. The Army plans: about 11 divisions. Guangchang offensive to the same time, the KMT Jianning Eastern Group in Fujian, Jiangxi Wollongong while the Sixth Army attacked in force the Chinese Communists to divide our forces to cope. The face of the Kuomintang army attacks, whether in Guangchang defense issues, the Red Army almost the same high-level view. Reid recalls: abandoned, the political can not be held accountable. situation. the enemy fortress in the sustained strategic and tactical doctrine, the advancing Guangchang is its strategically important step, in-depth in the area, the key to the implementation of total offense. We have to fight to defend Guangchang! battle won, the caused Diren and defeat more difficult conditions, will result in our shattered fifth 'encirclement' of the more powerful base. has been very limited. Early against With the expansion of the Red Army, Soviet beaten around the local tyrant to do, draw on the resources of the regularization (such as the establishment of the tax system), the Red Army and then to the early flow of combat is not as fewer scruples. KMT to collect relevant information about: The so-called 'Red Army dependents discount Ordinance', it is firmly in the more reliable bandit troops, only to family members and the share of the field, both in the Soviet area, if the share of the national army, then to maintain them to the person, since the failure to use . Guangchang military occupation, the county's membership of the Feibing, gradually falling into divorce is bound to escape the fighting capacity of bandit troops themselves, and therefore, had to hang on Guangchang of the difficulties. Guangchang determine the basic principle of defense as: far behind the development of guerrilla warfare, to create a new Soviet order embedded system and the mobilization of the enemy. large dispersion and weakening of the Red Army to fight the main conditions to be more convenient. the center of the work force entirely on the defensive line, and fortified against chaos. , to destroy the effective strength of the Kuomintang army, to prevent further Soviet military targets KMT. Follow the idea of warfare, the Red Army did not take steadily in Guangchang defense perimeter operational policy. According to the fifth against , the first line of defense Guangchang Gan outside the area north of bamboo is only a symbolic layout of the defense. Early April battle began, KMT goes well, almost no experience of major fighting soon occupied the area north of Gan bamboo. To participate in fighting the Kuomintang generals found that: poor, the elderly and mixed. 13, the KMT arrived in Gan bamboo into after the two sides launched a large scale battle, the Kuomintang troops first occupied Luo Jiabao, Li Jiabao and other peripheral position, and then control the Gan bamboo. Gan bamboo occupied, the KMT has been less than 40 years from the Guangchang, soldier front Guangchang direct threat, the next step to move around, the Red Army corps commander of the two main views vary. 14, according to the main direction of the KMT army judge, First Army Corps Long Lin Biao, Nie, political commissar of recommendations to the De: to lure the enemy main force in the present, ready to attack the main enemy of progress by the west, and ready to assault the city of Daejeon, Xikou the enemy advance. If weeks (Hun Yuan) Column Joint south to leap forward, we are easier to spot him.